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ABSTRACT 
 
The high rates of youth unemployment experienced in a number of OECD economies has 
raised concerns about the effect of this on subsequent earnings. Using the Australian 
Youth Survey (AYS) a longitudinal survey of Australian youth, we estimate the effects of 
unemployment on subsequent hourly and weekly earnings. The estimates suggest that, 
when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, it is only long histories of 
unemployment which have a negative effect on hourly wages. On the other hand, even 
relatively small amounts of unemployment history are associated with weekly earnings 
losses. The effects of unemployment on weekly earnings is shown to be mostly due to 
shorter working hours, with only a small part being due to lower hourly wages. These 
findings are consistent with the fact that Australia has binding minimum wages which 
limit the extent to which hourly wages can be reduced and so the impact of unemployment 
on earnings occurs through shorter working hours. Evidence is presented that this loss of 
working hours is involuntary and can therefore be counted as a cost of unemployment. 
 
 
  
1 
1  
1. Introduction 
One of the most striking features of the job market since the 1990s is the scale of the 
problems which young people face. Although more young people are undertaking  post-
secondary education, unemployment rates remain high across most OECD countries 
(OECD 1996 and 1998). This has raised concerns about the impact of the experience of 
unemployment during the early phases of a person’s working life, on their future labour 
market outcomes and the success of their entry into the labour market. One of the ways in 
which unemployment may impact upon future labour market outcomes is to reduce 
earnings in subsequent jobs, either by reducing hourly wages or by reducing the number 
of hours worked per week.  
 
This paper presents estimates of the effect of unemployment on the subsequent hourly 
and weekly earnings of young Australians using the Australian Youth Survey (AYS), a 
longitudinal data set. A wage equation framework augmented with measures of 
unemployment experience is used and the effects of unobserved heterogeneity are 
eliminated using a fixed effects (FE) estimator. The effects of unemployment on earnings 
are decomposed into that due to a lower hourly wage rate and that due to shorter working 
hours. 
 
While there are a number of papers which estimate the effects of unemployment on 
earnings (Gregory and Jukes1997; Garcia and Stern 1989; and Ackum 1991), the 
estimates presented in this paper are the first of the effects of unemployment on working 
hours. Given the importance of working hours in determining earnings, understanding the 
effects of unemployment on hours of work is of considerable interest.  
There are good reasons for thinking that the experience of unemployment may result in a 
lower number of hours worked in subsequent jobs, particularly in countries which have 
binding minimum wages such as Australia. 
 
The estimates presented in this paper suggest that, when unobserved heterogeneity is 
taken into account, it is only long histories of unemployment that have a negative effect 
on the hourly wages of young Australians. This is consistent with estimates for Sweden 
(Ackum, 1991 and young British men (Gregory and Jukes, 1997). On the other hand, 
relatively small amounts of unemployment history are associated with lower weekly 
earnings due to their critical role with respect to hours worked. 
 
Section 2 of the paper briefly discusses issues involved in estimating the relationship 
between unemployment and earnings. Section 3 develops the definition of the effects of 
unemployment on earnings used throughout the paper. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
framework and presents the estimates of the effects of unemployment on earnings. 
Section 5 considers the extent to which part-time employment is involuntary is explored, 
and Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Issues involved in estimating the effects of unemployment on 
earnings 
2.1 Theoretical literature 
A number of models of earnings determination suggest a link between the experience of 
unemployment and subsequent hourly wages and between unemployment and subsequent 
working hours. The impact of unemployment upon both these factors jointly determines 
the impact upon weekly earnings. 
Hourly wages  
The experience of unemployment may reduce hourly wages in subsequent jobs through 
two mechanisms. First, the experience of unemployment may reduce a worker's potential 
productivity therefore leading to a lower hourly wage than would have been received in 
the absence of the experience of unemployment. Second, the experience of 
unemployment may lead to the worker lowering the reservation wage at which they will 
accept a job. 
 
Within the human capital framework unemployment can reduce future wages only by 
decreasing productivity. This can occur through the loss of firm specific skills, 
depreciation of general human capital and through foregone skill development, which 
would have occurred, had the person remained employed. Depreciation of general human 
capital is generated by the experience of non-employment and not because of job loss in 
itself and therefore may increase with the duration of unemployment.1 On the other hand, 
the loss of firm specific skills is caused by the event of unemployment and is not directly 
related to the duration of the spell of unemployment. Forgone skill development may be 
particularly significant for younger workers, given the human capital arguments that the 
majority of investment in skills development occurs early in a person’s working life. 
 
Within in the human capital framework, whether or not, any negative effects of 
unemployment on hourly wages disappear over time depends upon the extent to which 
productivity recovers to what it would have been in the absence of the experience of 
unemployment. 
 
An alternative to the human capital framework is the screening hypothesis. If prospective 
employers have imperfect information about a potential employee’s productivity they 
need a means of screening workers for unobserved differences in productivity. If having a 
history of unemployment is correlated with unobserved differences in productivity, then 
employers may use unemployment history as a signal of unobserved productivity 
differences (Gibbons and Katz (1991); Lockwood (1991); Blanchard and Diamond 
(1994); and Doiron (1995)). 
 
Unfortunately, in the absence of direct information on the effects of unemployment on 
productivity, the human capital framework and the screening hypothesis are 
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observationally equivalent. 
 
Alternatively, the experience of unemployment may reduce hourly wages by leading 
individuals to lower the minimum hourly wage rate at which they will accept a job (the 
reservation wage). One class of models in which this may occur is search models. There 
are several reasons for thinking that reservation wages fall as the duration of 
unemployment increases. First, reservation wages may fall as the savings of the 
unemployed run out. Second, the experience of unemployment may decrease self-
confidence and cause a downward revision of expectation leading to a lowering of the 
wage at which a person will accept a job.  
 
Working hours 
There are a number of reasons why individuals who have a history of unemployment may 
work a lower number of hours per week than they would have worked had they never 
been unemployed. These reasons can be divided into supply side and demand side factors. 
On the supply side, individuals with a history of unemployment may prefer to work fewer 
hours. In this case, any association between unemployment history and lower hours of 
work reflects individual preferences and cannot be interpreted as a wage loss.  
 
On the demand side, employers may be prepared to only offer part-time jobs to 
individuals who have a history of unemployment. There are several possible explanations 
as to why employers may, on the basis of previous unemployment, restrict the range of 
hours associated with job offers. First, if having a history of unemployment makes 
employers uncertain as to the productivity of a potential employee and hiring and firing 
costs are lower for part-time than full-time workers, then employers may only be willing 
to employ people with a history of unemployment in jobs with lower hours.2 
 
Second, if unemployment history reduces productivity (or sends a negative signal), then 
the range of job offers the job seeker has to choose from may be reduced. Given that an 
increasing number of new jobs being generated are part-time (Dawkins and Norris 1995), 
this means that individuals with a history of unemployment are more likely to be 
employed part-time. 
 
Clearly, the different scenarios provide different interpretations of the data. If a worker 
would like to work more hours, but is unable to find a job with the desired number of 
hours because of their history of unemployment, the lower hours worked reflects a cost to 
the individual. If, on the other hand, individuals with a history of unemployment are 
working their desired number of hours, differences in hours worked cannot be interpreted 
as a loss. 
2.2 Australian wage setting institutions 
The Australian system of wage determination has historically been highly centralised. 
Until very recently most workers in an industry or occupation had their minimum rates of 
pay set centrally by an industrial commission or tribunal. The system has been commonly 
referred to as a system of compulsory arbitration.  
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Under the system of compulsory arbitration, the majority of workers had their minimum 
rates of pay and other terms of work set out in an 'award' made by one of a range of 
arbitration and conciliation tribunals. Collectively, an award can be defined as a written 
statement of the terms and conditions of employment. Most awards relate to an industry, 
but some cover occupational groups.  
 
Many award rates of pay and conditions, at both the Federal and State level, specify 
junior rates of pay. These junior rates of pay can cover workers aged 20 years and less, 
usually differ for each age in years and are set as proportions (typically rising according to 
age) of an adult award rate of pay (Daly et. al., 1998). This institutional characteristic 
means that award wages will increase with age in the Australian youth labour market 
independent of an individual's experience and other factors related to productivity. 
2.3 Existing studies 
There a several papers which have estimated the impact of unemployment upon future 
hourly earnings. Stern (1989) and Gregory and Jukes (1997), using data on United 
Kingdom (UK) men, found that unemployment has a negative impact upon subsequent 
individual hourly earnings. However, the negative effects are smallest for young men. 
Ackum (1991) found that amongst Swedish youth, once unobserved heterogeneity was 
taken into account there was no impact upon subsequent hourly wages. 
 
While there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the 
determinants of working hours, there appears to have been no research on the effect of 
unemployment upon working hours.  
3. Defining the effects of unemployment on earnings  
Before proceeding, careful attention needs to be paid to developing an appropriate 
definition of the effect of unemployment on earnings. This paper defines the effects of 
unemployment on earnings as the difference between what an individual with a given 
unemployment experience earns and what they would have earned had they never 
experienced unemployment. This definition allows for the earnings growth that would 
have occurred while the person was unemployed. It was first used in the program 
evaluation literature (LaLonde 1986) and has been used extensively in the job 
displacement literature (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993). It has also used by 
Ackum (1991) and Gregory and Jukes (1997) when estimating the effects of 
unemployment on earnings. 
 
Since, what the individual would have earned had they never been unemployed is 
unknown, earnings losses are defined as the difference between what a person with a 
particular pattern of unemployment history earns and what an otherwise similar person 
with no history of unemployment is expected to earn. 
 
The definition of earnings loss can be formalised as follows: 
       WLit = E(Wit | Xit, Dit=1) - E(Wit | Xit, Dit=0)            (1) 
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where WLit is the earnings loss (hourly or weekly) of individual i at time t. The first term 
on the right-hand side of equation 1 is the expected hourly or weekly earnings (Wit) of 
individual i at time t, conditional upon their personal characteristics (Xit) and having a 
particular experience of unemployment (Dit=1). Dit is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the individual has a particular history of unemployment and zero if they 
have never been unemployed. The vector of personal characteristics (Xit) includes all the 
factors, with the exception of unemployment history, which are related to the hourly or 
weekly earnings an individual receives. The second term on the right-hand side of 
equation 1 is the expected wage of individual i at time t, conditional upon their personal 
characteristics and never having experienced unemployment (Dit=0).  
4. Estimating the relationship between earnings and unemployment 
4.1 Estimating model 
As discussed, the effects of unemployment history upon hourly wages and weekly 
earnings are estimated using a wage equation framework augmented with measures of an 
individual’s unemployment history. The model estimated is expressed formally in 
equation (2): 
 
 lnWit=β+δXit + θZi + φUNEXPit + λURt + πREGION + αi + εit                    (2) 
where lnWit is the natural logarithm of real hourly wages or real weekly earnings, Xit is a 
vector of variables which measure individual characteristics that vary over time and 
across individuals and Zi is a vector of time invariant individual characteristics. 
Individual’s unemployment experience (UNEXPit) is measured by a set of variables 
measuring various dimensions of unemployment experience. The aggregate 
unemployment rate (URt) is included to pick up the effects of the macro-economy on 
wages. The effects of geographic region of residence on earnings are controlled for using 
state of residence dummies (REGIONit). αi represents an individual specific dummy 
variable that allows for the effects of any unobserved differences between individuals 
(unobserved heterogeneity) which are constant over time. These unobserved differences 
might include differences in innate ability, motivation or quality of secondary schooling. 
 
If equation (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) the error term is (αi+εit). 
If there is correlation between the error term and unemployment history (UNEXPit) then 
the estimated effects of unemployment history on wage profiles will be biased. Under 
certain assumptions, this bias can be eliminated using a fixed effects (FE) specification. 
The FE estimator assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time and 
can therefore be captured by differences in the constant term.3 When using the FE 
estimator, the effect of time invariant characteristics (Zi) cannot be estimated as the 
impact of these variables is captured by the individual specific. 
 
The OLS and FE estimates of the effects of unemployment on hourly and weekly earnings 
differ, indicating that the corresponding variables are correlated with the individual 
specific effects. This implies that the OLS estimates are biased by the correlation between 
the individual specific effects and the variables measuring unemployment experience.4 
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The discussion focuses on the FE estimates.5 
 
Individual unemployment histories are measured in three dimensions: (i) the length of 
time since the most recent spell of unemployment ended (TIMINGit); (ii) the duration of 
most recent spell of unemployment (RDURit); and (iii) the cumulated duration of all other 
spells of unemployment (CDURit).6 The measures of individual unemployment histories 
exclude time spent not-in-the labour force and unemployment while the individual is in 
secondary education or full-time tertiary. 
 
These measures of unemployment history can be explained with the aid of the following 
example. Figure 1 shows the time line of a hypothetical individual who has a history of 
unemployment. In this example, the individual was unemployed from time a to time b 
and then again from time c to time d. The individual was always employed when they 
were not unemployed (ie. from time 0 to time a, from time b to time c and from time d 
onwards). In terms of the measures of unemployment history, this individual’s most 
recent spell of unemployment has duration of (d-c) and the cumulated duration of other 
spells of unemployment is of length (b-a). If they are observed at time e then the length of 
time since the individual’s most recent spell of unemployment ended timing is (e-d).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Time line of unemployment history 
 
 
 
                 unemployed                   unemployed 
    
 
      0          a            b                       c             d                            e         Time 
 
 
 
 
These measures of unemployment history are "absolute" measures in that they represent 
actual lengths of time spent unemployed. An alternative would be to use relative 
measures of unemployment history (such as the proportion of time since leaving school 
spent unemployed). There are good reasons for thinking that wage losses from 
unemployment are related to the absolute length of time spent unemployed. For example, 
within the human capital model it is the duration of unemployment that is related to the 
depreciation of general human capital and not some relative measure of unemployment 
history.  
 
The duration of the most recent spell of unemployment (RDURit) is specified using 
dummy variables which indicated the number of quarters (3 months) the spell of 
  
7 
7  
unemployment lasted for (one, two, three and four or more quarters). Similarly, the 
cumulated duration of other spells of unemployment (CDURit) is also specified using a 
dummy variable specification (one, two, three, four and five or more quarters of 
unemployment). All the measures of unemployment history are set equal to zero for 
respondents with no experience of unemployment. 
 
The separation of unemployment experience into the duration of the most recent spell of 
unemployment (RDURit) and the cumulated duration of all other spells of unemployment 
(CDURit) allows us to get some insight into the effects of multiple spells of 
unemployment. Individuals who have only one spell of unemployment have a cumulated 
duration of all other spells of unemployment of zero, whereas individuals who have more 
than one spell of unemployment will have a positive amount of cumulated duration of all 
other spells of unemployment. 
 
The length of time since last unemployed is specified as the reciprocal of the number of 
weeks since the most recent spell of unemployment ended (TIMINGit). This variable is 
set equal to zero for those with no history of unemployment, since a value of zero, 
implies that the time interval since the most recent spell of unemployment approaches 
infinity. The reciprocal of the number of weeks since the last spell of unemployment 
increases the shorter the length of time since the last spell of unemployment ended. The 
timing measure is entered into the regression model using a quadratic specification in 
order to allow a more flexible functional form. 
 
The vector of time varying individual characteristics include: age and age squared; actual 
employment experience measured in weeks (Exp); tenure in current job and tenure 
squared measured in weeks (Tenure, Tenure2); marital status (Married); and having health 
problems that limit the amount or type of work that can be done (Health). In principle, 
educational attainment varies over time. In practice however, there is very little variation 
in educational attainment and so educational attainment is treated as being a fixed 
characteristic. 
 
The inclusion of age and actual employment experience differs from the conventional 
specification, which does not include age (Borland and Suen 1994; Preston 1997). Age is 
included in the specification to control for the age basis of minimum hourly wages in 
Australia. The short range of employment experience maximum 6 years means that a 
linear specification is a very close approximation to the relationship.  
 
In addition, a dummy variable for being a full-time worker (Full-time) is included in the 
estimates of the effects of unemployment upon hourly wages. Obviously this variable is 
not included in the estimates of weekly earnings. The effects of local labour market 
conditions are controlled for by dummy variables for state of residence (NSW, VIC, 
QLD, SA, WA, TAS, ACT, NT). Detailed information on the construction of the 
variables is presented in Table 1. 
 
The empirical specification imposes a number of restrictions upon the ways in which 
unemployment history can affect wages. First, the returns to experience, tenure, and the 
effects of age, hours of work, being a member of a union, industry and occupation of 
employment are restricted to be the same regardless of unemployment history.7 Second, 
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the slope of the re-employment wage profile, as measured by the coefficient on the timing 
variables, is restricted to be the same for all individuals with a history of unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Description of the variables  
Variable Description 
Wage Natural logarithm of real hourly wage. Constructed by dividing individuals 
normal weekly earnings by normal hours worked per week. Respondents 
who refused to give earnings to the dollar or said they did not know (very 
small proportion of the sample) were asked which earnings category they 
fell into. For individuals who answered this question the midpoint of each 
income category is used. The highest income category is top coded at 1.5 
times. The hourly wages are converted into 1989 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
Earnings Natural logarithm of real weekly wage. The weekly earnings are converted 
into 1989 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
Age, Age2 Age and age squared measured in calendar years 
Exp Actual employment experience in weeks. Employment experience whilst 
attending secondary school or full-time tertiary education is excluded. 
Tenure, Tenure2 Weeks of tenure in current job 
Married A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is married 
(includes defacto relationships)  
Health A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual has health 
problems that limit the amount or type of work they can do and 0 otherwise. 
Full-time A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the person usually worked 
more than 30 hours a week and 0 otherwise. 
UR Aggregate unemployment rate for the population 15 to 65 years of age 
NSW, VIC, QLD, SA, 
WA, TAS, ACT, NT  
Dummy variable controls for living in the states of New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory 
1/Timing , (1/Timing)2 the reciprocal of the number of weeks since the most recent spell of 
unemployment ended. This variable is set equal to zero for those with no 
history of unemployment (implying that the time interval approaches 
infinity) 
RDUR A set of dummy variables indicating duration of most recent spell of 
unemployment quarters of unemployment history. Coded as a set of dummy 
variables indicating having 1 to 4 or more quarters of unemployment 
history. The omitted category is having no unemployment history. Excludes 
unemployment experience whilst in education.  
CDUR A set of dummy variables indicating cumulated duration of other spells of 
unemployment. Coded as a set of dummy variables indicating having 1 to 5 
or more quarters of unemployment history. The omitted category is having 
no unemployment history. Excludes unemployment experience whilst in 
education. 
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4.2 Data 
The effects of unemployment history on hourly earnings are estimated using the AYS, a 
longitudinal data set of individuals aged 16 to 24. The AYS began in 1989 with a sample 
of 5,350 individuals drawn from the Australian population aged 16 to 19 years. Since 1989 
these individuals have been interviewed annually, with the obvious exception of those not 
able to be contacted. In addition, in each year from 1990 a new sample of 16-year-olds has 
been interviewed. By 1994, information on 11,767 individuals had been collected. The 
survey contains questions on a wide range of demographic, socioeconomic and labour 
market issues (for further details on the AYS see Miller (1995)). Of particular importance 
for this study is that complete labour force histories can be derived using employment and 
job search calendars contained in the AYS.8  
 
The sample used in the wage regressions was selected using the following criteria. 
Observations where the individual was not employed at the time of the interview are 
excluded, as are observations that come from an individual in secondary education or 
full-time tertiary education at the time of the interview.9 Descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the econometric analysis are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 
for males and females respectively.  
 
The AYS experiences significant sample attrition, with 40 per cent of the original 1989 
sample, no longer present in the survey by 1994. If this sample attrition is not random 
(either in terms of observable or unobservable factors) then the representativeness of the 
sample may decrease over time and estimates of the relationship between unemployment 
and earnings may be biased.  
 
The estimates of the relationship between unemployment and earnings do not appear to be 
biased by the sample attrition. Gray (1999) presents a detailed analysis of rates of sample 
attrition in the AYS and whether the attrition distorts the representativeness of the AYS in 
terms of a range of observable characteristics. Gray (1999) shows that the mean value of 
the hourly and weekly wages do not differ between the attritors and the non-attritors. It is 
also found that unobserved heterogeneity between attritors and non-attritors is not related 
to unobserved components of the level or rate of growth of wages. While attritors are more 
likely to have been unemployed than non-attritors when other personal characteristics are 
taken into account, having experienced unemployment is not associated with the 
probability of attriting from the sample. 
4.3 The relationship between unemployment and hourly wages 
Since the focus of this paper is on the effects of unemployment history on earnings we 
discuss only briefly the estimates of the other variables (see Gray (1999) for a 
comprehensive discussion of the estimates for the other variables). For both males and 
females, increases in age are estimated to increase hourly wages at a decreasing rate. Being 
married and having poor health are statistically insignificant. Being a full time worker is 
associated with lower hourly wages. This probably reflects the wage premia part-time 
workers receive in lieu of holiday pay or sick leave. 
 
While the estimated coefficients on the variables measuring the length of the most recent 
spell of unemployment are negative, they are very small in size and statistically 
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insignificant. For both males and females, it is only very large amounts of unemployment 
experience that have a negative effect on hourly wages. For example, a cumulated 
duration of other spells of unemployment of five or more quarters is estimated to decrease 
the hourly wages of males by 11.5 percentage points.  
 
These results imply that hourly wage losses are generated by repeated spells of 
unemployment which add up to a very large amount of unemployment history. The 
magnitude of wage losses for females are similar to those for males, but are generated by 
a slightly smaller amount of unemployment experience with four or more quarters of 
cumulated unemployment experience estimated to decrease hourly wages by 14.2 
percentage points. The variables measuring the length of time since the most recent spell 
of unemployment ended (Timing and Timing2) are individually and jointly statistically 
insignificant for both males and females. This also implies that individuals with a 
experience of unemployment are not employed in jobs which have a lower rate of hourly 
wage growth than individuals who have never been unemployed. 
 
 
Table 2. FE estimates of the effects of unemployment history on hourly wages and 
weekly earnings 
 Hourly wages Weekly earnings 
 Males Females Males Females 
 Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
Age 0.58216 10.60 0.61172 15.50 0.72063 8.53 0.72048 10.74 
Age2 -0.0121 9.18 -0.0127 13.33 -0.01454 7.17 -0.0148 9.14 
Exp (weeks) 0.00025 0.79 -0.00019 0.80 0.0018 3.71 0.00236 5.77 
Tenure (weeks) -0.00056 0.85 0.0004 0.97 0.00292 2.87 0.0018 2.55 
Tenure2 (weeks) 0.00001 1.20 0 0.49 -0.00003 3.18 -0.00002 3.93 
Married -0.03151 1.40 0.01561 1.21 -0.02463 0.71 -0.03995 1.82 
Health 0.01053 0.37 0.0069 0.34 0.02994 0.69 -0.03886 1.12 
Full-time -0.10455 5.35 -0.15424 12.85     
NSW 0.02438 0.37 0.09362 1.73 -0.00105 0.01 -0.0479 0.52 
QLD 0.00295 0.04 0.04073 0.78 -0.05181 0.48 -0.01297 0.15 
SA 0.19081 1.75 0.03647 0.51 -0.03016 0.18 -0.26182 2.16 
WA 0.26016 1.94 0.13584 1.64 0.05134 0.25 -0.22988 1.63 
TAS 0.13228 0.71 -0.12394 0.97 0.07991 0.28 -0.39845 1.83 
ACT 0.14426 1.50 0.12842 1.35 -0.0378 0.26 0.03589 0.22 
NT 0.18117 1.35 0.35239 3.93 -0.03609 0.18 0.1947 1.28 
UR -1.27135 2.59 -0.23374 0.69 -4.4009 5.86 -1.97192 3.41 
Timing -0.14506 0.97 0.05704 0.50 -0.56391 2.45 -0.34654 1.79 
Timing2 0.10836 0.65 -0.06566 0.53 0.49011 1.91 0.13918 0.66 
Duration of most recent spell of unemployment (quarters) 
1 quarter -0.01603 0.65 -0.00642 0.43 -0.04394 1.17 -0.0383 1.52 
2 quarters -0.04413 1.39 -0.00753 0.35 -0.05149 1.05 -0.12847 3.52 
3 quarters -0.02593 0.58 -0.00897 0.31 -0.14183 2.07 -0.0657 1.33 
4 quarters -0.0032 0.04 -0.0514 1.22 -0.15819 1.42 -0.13049 1.81 
Cumulated duration of other spells of unemployment (quarters) 
1 quarter 0.03856 1.64 -0.01277 0.83 0.01105 0.31 -0.03922 1.51 
2 quarters 0.02904 0.85 -0.00599 0.28 -0.0396 0.75 -0.08958 2.44 
3 quarters -0.01334 0.32 -0.01514 0.54 -0.06665 1.04 -0.19556 4.11 
4 quarters 0.02303 0.41 -0.15357 3.69 0.08967 1.04 -0.3757 5.31 
5+ quarters -0.12231 1.98 -0.13094 2.46 -0.28671 3.02 -0.40782 4.50 
Constant -4.45679 8.11 -4.92571 12.41 -2.48885 2.94 -2.67977 3.97 
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Number of obs 3386  4913  3386  4913  
# Groups 1127  1495  1127  1495  
R-sq within 0.2795  0.3841  0.2206  0.2290  
F-test FE F(1126,2232)~2.47 F(1494,3388)~2.33 F(1126,2231)~ 2.79 F(1494,3389)~3.55 
Notes. The omitted region dummy is Victoria. For males and females, the F-test of the joint significance of 
the FE indicates that they are jointly significantly different than 0 at the 1 percent level, implying 
that individual FEs are present in the data (Baltagi (1995)). A Hausman specification test suggests 
that the random effects specification is inappropriate for the AYS data and that an FE specification 
is appropriate. 
 
 
A possible source of bias is that wages are observed only for individuals who were 
employed at the time of the annual interview. We have not attempted to test and correct 
for this type of sample selection for two reasons. First, the FE specification controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity which is constant over time and should reduce, if not eliminate 
any biases. Second, the Heckman correction term in the cross-sectional case has no effect 
upon the coefficient estimates and the Heckman correction term was statistically 
insignificant (Gray 1999). 
4.4 The relationship between unemployment and weekly earnings 
Since weekly earnings are determined jointly by the number of hours worked and the 
hourly wage rate, any effect from unemployment on subsequent weekly earnings will be 
the combined result of these factors. As with the discussion of the effects of 
unemployment on hourly wages, the discussion in this section focuses on the variables 
measuring unemployment experience (see Gray (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of 
the estimates for the other variables). 
 
For both males and females, increases in age are estimated to increase weekly earnings at a 
decreasing rate. Increases in experience are estimated to increase weekly earnings. 
Increases in tenure are also estimated to increase weekly earnings at a decreasing rate. 
Marital and health status were found to have no statistically significant effect upon weekly 
earnings 
 
The estimates suggest that unemployment experience can have a substantial negative 
effect upon the earnings for males and females. Weekly wage losses are associated with 
the most recent spell of unemployment and with the cumulated duration of other spells of 
unemployment. The estimated wage losses increase with the duration of unemployment 
experience and are very substantial for large amounts of unemployment experience. The 
effects of the cumulated duration of other spells of unemployment are larger than the 
effects of the most recent spell of unemployment. This implies that multiple spells of 
unemployment experience are particularly damaging in terms of weekly earnings. The 
coefficients on the timing variables are jointly statistically significant and imply weekly 
earnings losses decrease with continuing employment. 
 
One possible reason for the negative effect of unemployment history on weekly earnings 
is the loss of union, industry or occupation wage premium. The estimated wage losses did 
not change significantly when trade union membership was controlled for, suggesting that 
the wage losses are not a result of the loss of union wage premium. Controlling the 
industry and occupation of employment leads to reductions in the estimated wage losses, 
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but the reductions are relatively small (Gray (1999)). 
4.5 Decomposition of earnings losses into hourly wage rate and number of hours 
worked effects 
This section presents a decomposition of the effects of unemployment on weekly earnings 
into those due to a lower hourly wage rate and those due to a lower number of hours of 
worked. This is possible because the only factor determining the difference between 
hourly and weekly earnings is the number of hours worked per week.  The hourly wage 
loss is given directly from the hourly wage regression. The wage loss due to the loss of 
hours is calculated as the difference between the total wage loss (estimated from the 
weekly earnings regression) and the hourly wage losses. 
 
For this decomposition to be valid the hourly wage rate and the number of hours worked 
must be independent. The estimates of the determinants of hourly wages demonstrate that 
working more than 30 hours per week (full-time employment) is negatively related to 
hourly wages. There are a number of reasons for the negative relationship between hourly 
wages and working hours. Vella (1993) argues that the negative relationship between 
weekly hours worked and the gross hourly wage rate is due to employers and employees 
avoiding taxation by substituting wages with non-taxable, non-wage benefits as the total 
weekly wage increases.  
 
The inclusion of a control for working hours in the hourly wage regression model should 
reduce the effects of this correlation. Any correlation between the number of hours 
worked and the hourly wage rate probably leads this decomposition to understate the 
proportion of wages losses due to lower number of hours of work, since part-time 
workers, ceteris paribus, receive a higher hourly rate of pay.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of decomposing the weekly earnings losses into the part due 
to a lower hourly rate of pay and the part due to a decrease in the number of hours 
worked. The wage losses for the following patterns of unemployment history are 
presented: most recent spell of unemployment lasted for one, two, three and four or more 
quarters and no other unemployment experience (ie individual has experienced one spell 
of unemployment); duration of most recent spell two quarters and three quarters of 
cumulated other unemployment spells; and duration of most recent spell four or more 
quarters and five or more quarters of cumulated other unemployment spells. For each 
pattern of unemployment history it is assumed that the length of time since the most 
recent spell of unemployment ended is four weeks. 
 
As an example for the interpretation of Table 3, consider females who have a most recent 
spell of unemployment which lasted four or more quarters and have five or more quarters 
of other unemployment experience. The estimated total wage loss is 53.5 percentage 
points, of which 20.2 percentage points is due to lower hourly wages and 33.3 percentage 
points is due to working fewer hours per week. For males with an identical 
unemployment history the total wage loss is 50.6 percentage points, of which hourly wage 
losses account for 14.8 percentage points and 35.8 percentage points is due to fewer hours 
being worked. 
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It is clear that the negative effects of unemployment history on the hourly wage rate are 
very small unless the person has experienced a lot of unemployment. On the other hand, 
even relatively short histories of unemployment are associated with substantially lower 
working hours and weekly earnings.  
 
5. The extent to which part-time employment is involuntary 
While we have shown that effect of previous unemployment on weekly earnings is mostly 
due to a lower number of hours worked per week it is not possible to conclude from these 
results whether the lower hours of work is voluntary or involuntary. In this section, 
evidence is presented on the extent to which part-time employees with differing amounts 
of unemployment experience would prefer to work full-time. If people working part-time 
would prefer to work full-time this is prima facie evidence that they are hours constrained 
and the effects of unemployment on hours of work can indeed be interpreted as a cost.  
 
 
Table 3. Predicted wage losses 
 Males Female 
 Rate Hours Weekly Rate Hours Weekly 
 Per cent 
1 quarter -4.5 -10.8 -15.3 0.4 -11.9 -11.6 
2 quarters -7.3 -8.8 -16.1 0.3 -20.1 -19.8 
3 quarters -5.5 -18.7 -24.3 0.1 -14.3 -14.2 
4 quarters -3.3 -22.4 -25.7 -4.0 -16.0 -20.0 
2 quarters, 3 quarters -8.6 -13.9 -22.5 -1.2 -36.4 -37.6 
4+ quarters, 5+ quarters -14.8 -35.8 -50.6 -20.2 -33.3 -53.5 
Notes. In all cases it is assumed that the length of time since the most recent spell of unemployment ended is 
four weeks. The percentage effect of each dummy variable on earnings is given by )100)1(( ↔−βe . 
 
 
Table 4. Preference for full-time work for those working less than 30 hours a week, 
by the percentage of time spent unemployed 
 Mean Standard deviation Number of 
observations 
 per cent 
Males    
No unemployment 45.1 0.4985 286 
0.01% to 25% 46.5 0.4995 310 
26% to 50% 56.9 0.4967 167 
51% to 75% 72.5 0.4500 69 
76% to 99% 74.7 0.4378 75 
Females    
No unemployment 43.7 0.4966 455 
0.01% to 25% 43.9 0.4968 510 
26% to 50% 54.9 0.4985 299 
51% to 75% 57.9 0.4956 140 
76% to 99% 57.7 0.4963 111 
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Note. The question "Would you rather be working full time - that is, 30 hours a week or more - or part-
time?" is asked of individuals who were employed for less than 30 hours a week at the time of the 
interview. On the basis of this question preference for part-time employment is derived. 
 
Table 4 shows the proportion of individuals employed part-time who would prefer to 
work full-time, cross-tabulated by the percentage of time in the labour market which has 
been spent unemployed. For example of the males employed part-time and with no 
history of unemployment, 45.1 percent said they would rather be working full-time as 
opposed to part-time. By contrast, of the  males who were also employed part-time, but 
had been unemployed for between 51 percent and 75 percent of the time they had been in 
the labour force, nearly 73 percent expressed a preference for full-time employment, more 
than 30 percentage points higher than amongst males with no history of unemployment. 
 
For males and females employed part-time, the proportion preferring to work full-time 
increases as the percentage of time they have spent unemployed increases. This can be 
interpreted as meaning that individuals who have a history of unemployment are more 
likely to face an hours constraint than individuals with no history of unemployment. 
 
The high proportion of the part-time employed who wish to work more hours is 
suggestive of significant under-employment in youth labour markets, especially when it is 
considered that these figures exclude individuals who were in secondary education or 
full-time tertiary education. 
6. Conclusions 
The effects of unemployment history on hourly wages and weekly earnings have been 
estimated using a wage equation framework augmented with measures of individual 
unemployment history. Within this framework the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, 
which may bias the estimates, are controlled for using a fixed effects estimator. 
 
The main findings are the following. Amongst young Australian males and females, when 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, it is only after experiencing very large 
amounts of unemployment history that there are negative effects of unemployment history 
on hourly wages. However, unemployment history is associated with statistically 
significant weekly earnings losses and for large amounts of unemployment history weekly 
earnings losses are very substantial. 
 
The estimated weekly earnings losses, in percentage terms, are much larger than the 
hourly wage losses and are generated by much smaller amounts of unemployment history. 
This suggests that the effects of unemployment history on weekly earnings are 
predominantly generated by a lower number of hours worked rather a lower hourly wage 
rate. There does appear to be some recovery in weekly earnings with continuing re-
employment, although there is no evidence of recovery in hourly wages. This means that 
the recovery in weekly earnings is due to an increase in the number of hours worked. This 
is consistent with the findings of Gaston and Timcke (1999) that there is a significant 
degree of movement from part-time employment to full-time employment amongst young 
Australians. 
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The evidence presented suggests that the lower number of hours worked is not the result 
of differences in preferences, but is an involuntary loss of hours. Consequently, this 
reduction can be interpreted as an earnings loss. Further, the estimated weekly earnings 
losses become larger as the cumulated duration of unemployment history increases. 
 
Other research has found that the experience of unemployment increases the probability 
of experiencing repeated unemployment amongst young Australians (Junankar and 
Wood, 1992; and Knights, Harris and Loundes 2000). One hypothesis that is consistent 
with these findings is that the experience of unemployment lowers productivity, or 
employers' expectation of productivity. However, as historical institutional arrangements 
in the Australian labour market limit the extent to which an individual can lower the 
hourly rate of pay for which they will work, the effects of unemployment on future labour 
market outcomes occurs through a lower number of hours worked combined with an 
increased rate of joblessness. These findings imply that the costs of unemployment 
continue after reemployment and suggest that current measures of the costs of 
unemployment may understate the true cost.  
 
  
16 
1 6  
Appendix A. Statistical characteristics of the data 
Table A1. Statistical characteristics of the AYS data set, males 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Wage ($/hr) 9.789 4.59 ESB migrant 0.049 0.2152 
Weekly wage ($/wk) 342.35 185.50 NSW 0.308 0.4618 
Weekly hours 38.52 342.35 QLD 0.217 0.4121 
Age 19.96 1.982 SA 0.085 0.2791 
Experience (weeks) 51.52 31.7 WA 0.096 0.2943 
Tenure (weeks) 34.49 23.8 TAS 0.033 0.1791 
Tenure2 (weeks) 1757 2536 ACT 0.019 0.1376 
Married 0.1 0.2994 NT 0.005 0.0736 
Health 0.066 0.2475 UR 0.094 0.017 
Union 0.334 0.4717 Timing (weeks) 41.01 57.4572 
Full-time 0.871 0.3351 Duration most recent spell of unemployment 
Year 9 0.041 0.1978 1 quarter 0.413 0.4924 
Year 10 0.155 0.3617 2 quarters 0.121 0.3262 
Year 11 0.107 0.3093 3 quarters 0.051 0.2192 
Year 12 0.293 0.4553 4 quarters or more 0.019 0.1367 
Degree 0.049 0.2164 Cumulated duration of other spells of unemployment 
Diploma 0.033 0.1777 1 quarter 0.171 0.3764 
Trade 0.096 0.2943 2 quarters 0.066 0.2485 
Certificate 0.127 0.3327 3 quarters 0.036 0.1874 
Other qual 0.1 0.2998 4 quarters 0.015 0.1214 
NESB migrant 0.048 0.2141 5 quarters or more 0.019 0.1367 
      
Number of individuals 1127     
Number of observations 3386     
Note. Statistical characteristics are for the sample that is employed and has valid wage observations. 
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Table A2. Statistical characteristics of the AYS data set, females 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Wage ($/hr) 9.069 3.92 ESB migrant 0.039 0.1944 
Weekly wage ($/wk) 283.71 123.56 NSW 0.289 0.4534 
Weekly hours 34.64 10.48 QLD 0.204 0.4028 
Age 19.79 19.79 SA 0.112 0.315 
Experience (weeks) 50.99 30.7113 WA 0.11 0.3128 
Tenure (weeks) 36.18 23.9 TAS 0.037 0.189 
Tenure2 (weeks) 1879 3028 ACT 0.015 0.1199 
Married 0.184 0.3872 NT 0.013 0.1114 
Health 0.059 0.2356 UR 0.093 0.0172 
Union 0.301 0.4588 Timing (weeks) 36.79 54.2844 
Full-time 0.796 0.4031 Duration most recent spell of unemployment 
Year 9 0.019 0.1367 1 quarter 0.413 0.4924 
Year 10 0.103 0.3037 2 quarters 0.098 0.2975 
Year 11 0.107 0.3087 3 quarters 0.038 0.1915 
Year 12 0.291 0.4541 4 quarters or more 0.016 0.1263 
Degree 0.061 0.2394 Cumulated duration of other spells of unemployment 
Diploma 0.09 0.2865 1 quarter 0.154 0.3612 
Trade 0.016 0.1255 2 quarters 0.061 0.2398 
Certificate 0.228 0.4196 3 quarters 0.032 0.1756 
Other qual 0.086 0.2797 4 quarters 0.014 0.1183 
NESB migrant 0.036 0.1865 5 quarters or more 0.008 0.0886 
      
Number of individuals 1495     
Number of observations 4913     
Note. As for Table A1. 
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1  The depreciation of general human capital might include a negative impact upon 
mental health which lessens productivity. 
2    Reasons as to why it is cheaper to sack an employee who is a part-time casual than an 
employee who is full-time permanent include: no redundancy payments severance pay; 
less problems with unions; and less friction within the workplace (see Simpson, 
Dawkins and Madden 1997). 
3  The fixed effect estimator assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over 
time and can therefore be captured by differences in the constant term. In principle this 
can be implemented by including a dummy variable for each individual in the sample. 
However, in practice, since the inclusion of a dummy variable for each individual, 
results in a very large number of parameters being estimated, the data is transformed 
by taking deviations from individual specific means and then running OLS on the 
transformed data. Corrections to the standard errors are made to account for the fact 
that the individual specific means are estimated (Greene 1997). 
4  Another possible reason for the a difference between the OLS and FE estimates is 
measurement error on the explanatory variables, the effects of which can be greatly 
exacerbated by standard FE estimation, especially if the explanatory variables are 
correlated across time (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  
5  The OLS results are available from the author on request. 
6  The discussion of the theoretical literature indicated that the effect of unemployment 
history on wages is likely to be related to whether the spell of unemployment history 
resulted from a voluntary quit or whether it resulted from an involuntary separation. 
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Unfortunately the AYS data set does not allow the reason for each spell of 
unemployment to be determined. 
7  In principle it is possible to estimate a specification which allowed the coefficient on the 
observable characteristics to vary with unemployment history. In practice this was not 
possible in the AYS because there is not enough data degrees of freedom.  
8  Complete labour force histories cannot be constructed for respondents who experience 
temporary sample attrition or had a significant amount of labour force experience 
prior to the first interview. The proportion of the sample that has incomplete labour 
force histories is very small and the results are unlikely to be biased by this. Individuals 
with a substantial amount of pre-survey employment experience are excluded from the 
analysis. 
9  Individuals who were employed at the interview but refused to say, or did not know 
what their usual weekly earnings or usual weekly hours are excluded. Only a very small 
number of individuals had missing information on weekly earnings or hours worked. 
